In September 2026, the constitutional term for which I was elected as magistrate of the National Electoral Council will end. Four years of work do not provide definitive certainties, but they do offer a learning experience: the solidity of an election does not depend solely on producing reliable results. It also requires understandable rules, fair competition, independent authorities, and the ability to respond to transformations that advance faster than the law. From that experience, I modestly and constructively propose some reforms that should be discussed in the country.
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The first is the update of electoral regulations in the face of the digital environment. The internet, social networks, and artificial intelligence have changed the way campaigns are run, support is mobilized, and citizen will is contested. Meanwhile, much of the regulation remains anchored in 20th-century categories (radio, press, or television). Disinformation, algorithmic manipulation, hate speech, content automation, and the misuse of personal data are no longer marginal risks.
The response cannot be censorship. It must be transparency. Propaganda created or disseminated through artificial intelligence should be clearly identified with transparency notices. Bots (automated programs that spread messages) and deepfakes (videos, audios, or images manipulated with AI to appear real) should be labeled, and the use of segmentation processes (which group voters by general traits) or micro-segmentation (which groups them based on specific data) should be disclosed.
All platforms should maintain public and auditable records of who finances each political ad, which audiences it targets, the criteria for its distribution, and what data it uses. Additionally, the use of sensitive personal data for political promotion, such as ethnic origin, political opinions, religion, health, or sexual orientation, as well as data obtained from tracking people’s online activity without their express authorization, should be prohibited.
It is also necessary to harmonize the community rules of digital platforms, particularly social networks, with the legal periods established for electoral propaganda, which, as a general rule, can only be disseminated during the 60 days prior to the respective election. Today, paid electoral propaganda is observed on social networks in Colombia outside of that period. In practice, this means that platforms earn income by allowing an activity that the law prohibits.
In the same vein, Google should enable its transparency reports on political advertising in Colombia. Unlike what happens in other countries, it is currently not possible to fully consult the political ads disseminated in Colombia through Google Ads or YouTube, know who finances them, or determine how much is invested in them. Likewise, it is necessary to regulate propaganda circulated through messaging services such as WhatsApp or Telegram.
The Communications Regulation Commission and operators must have tools to prevent the mass sending of messages before the authorized legal period (Law 996 of 2005, Law 1475 of 2011) or during the election day (Law 163 of 1994). Sanctions applicable to platforms and operators must be sufficiently deterrent and, in serious or repeated cases, could include, as a last resort, the temporary suspension of the involved service, always respecting the principles of legality, proportionality, and due process.
Regulation must also address pre-campaigns. Currently, it is possible to invest in digital advertising before a candidacy is formally registered, without those expenses being reported to the CNE or taken into account to calculate campaign limits.
Added to this is political promotion carried out by influencers and streamers. A guide of good practices and clear disclosure rules are required in these cases.
Similarly, digital platforms should offer specialized channels to report and quickly remove sexist or defamatory content generated with artificial intelligence, in coordination with authorities. A principle of responsible innovation would allow the CNE, with the support of a technical authority, to demand documentation, audit technologies, prevent gender biases, and suspend uses that violate rights.
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The second reform concerns political financing. There remains a gap between the real cost of campaigns and what is actually declared. In the four national and territorial elections prior to 2026, income and expense reports decreased by about 17%. There are also risks of triangulation: contributions given to parties as operating expenses that end up financing campaigns. While in non-electoral periods private donations rarely exceed 800 million pesos, during campaigns they can exceed 50,000 million.
Therefore, the National Political Financing Fund needs an interdisciplinary team specialized in financial intelligence and forensic analysis, as well as more agile mechanisms to exchange information in real time with the UIAF. It is also advisable to integrate the Online Registry of Private Contributions to Electoral Campaigns, developed by Transparency for Colombia and offered free of charge to the CNE, into Cuentas Claras. This tool would allow each private contribution to be directly registered, along with its supports, and contrasted with the information reported by parties and candidates. Thus, as other magistrates of this Council have also proposed, the receipt of private donations intended for the operation of parties during the twelve months prior to each election should be prohibited. This would reduce the risk of those resources being triangulated towards campaigns.
The third transformation must reach the CNE itself. Its magistrates are elected by Congress from lists presented by political parties. Although this mechanism seeks to reflect political pluralism, it can also affect the perception of the body’s independence, especially when it exercises competencies as sensitive as the revocation of registrations, which directly affects the fundamental right to be elected. In these cases, there is a risk that its decisions are perceived as mechanisms of political exclusion. To strengthen trust in the electoral authority, a model similar to that provided for the Constitutional Court could be considered, in which the high courts and the Presidency participate in the formation of the lists and Congress retains the final election. Longer terms and staggered renewal could also help reinforce the autonomy, continuity, and technical rigor of the CNE.
This reform should be accompanied by an updated electoral code that gathers scattered norms, preserves what works, and eliminates contradictions and gaps. A statutory law regulating the process of revocation of registrations is also required. The CNE exercises, as indicated, a function that can limit political rights in this matter. Therefore, there should be judicial control before the vote, compatible with the electoral calendar deadlines and inter-American standards. After the elections, the opportunity to compete, when a registration has been revoked, can no longer properly be restored.
The internal democracy of parties also needs guarantees. The granting of endorsements should not depend on the unilateral power of their leaders. Mandatory primaries or consultations would give legitimacy to the selection of candidacies and allow closed lists to be the result of truly participatory procedures. To improve voter information, debates between candidates for the Presidency, governorships, and mayoralties should be mandatory.
The territorial composition of the Senate also deserves discussion. The national constituency of 1991 sought to strengthen parties and national debates but has concentrated representation and left several departments without direct presence. Reforming Article 171 of the Constitution to establish a departmental constituency, with seats distributed by proportionality criteria similar to those of the Chamber, would better reflect the country’s diversity.
Finally, it is advisable to review the regime of caucuses and dual membership in light of the principles of judicial reserve and proportionality. Sanctions or decisions that seriously restrict the exercise of political rights should be adopted by a judicial authority and not exclusively by a political party (in cases of violation of voting discipline). Furthermore, their imposition should always be based on the existence of a certain and imminent risk or an effective harm to the legal goods sought to be protected, and not on merely abstract considerations.
These proposals do not seek to close the debate but to contribute to it based on the problems observed during the exercise of this magistracy. They are, above all, starting points that should be examined and enriched by institutions, parties, and citizens. I conclude my term grateful for the opportunity to serve the country and with a simple conviction: strengthening democracy requires acting with integrity and independence, but also maintaining the willingness to review and update its institutions when experience so advises.
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