It does not have the same effect to scold the mischievous student in class as to punish the exemplary student, even if it is just with a tug on the ear. That is why the Pentagon’s decision to withdraw 5,000 soldiers from Germany, which until this week, when its chancellor said that Iran was “humiliating” the United States in the war, had done everything well in terms of not openly confronting Washington ―as Spain has―, has been strongly felt throughout NATO.
Because although the impact in military terms is limited, the political message of the gesture has sounded loud and clear in all allied capitals: Donald Trump is very angry with Europe’s no to blindly follow him in his military adventure against Iran and is willing to make them pay. With fewer troops or with more tariffs, like those he now also wants to impose on European cars.
“The announced withdrawal is relatively small, but seeks to send a political message after Chancellor [Friedrich Merz]’s criticism of U.S. policy on Iran,” says Daniel Kochis, senior researcher at the Center for Europe and Eurasia at the Hudson Institute and a specialist in transatlantic security.
The possibility that the United States would carry out a NATO troop redeployment in Europe was something allies on this side of the Atlantic had anticipated even before the Republican returned to the White House. In fact, Washington already took a first step last October when it announced its intention to cut nearly half of the 1,700 troops it maintains in Romania, in one of the Alliance’s missions to protect the eastern flank against the Russian threat.
This has also been estimated by Germany’s Defense Minister, Boris Pistorius, who has described the decision to relocate a reduced contingent —5,000 of more than 36,000 permanently deployed on German territory— in the next six to 12 months as “predictable.” The military impact, allied sources agree, will be limited both for a Germany that is racing against time to strengthen its defense, and for the Alliance itself. Especially because Trump has little room to maneuver to go much further, given that the U.S. Defense Authorization Act passed late last year prohibits the government from reducing its military presence in Europe below 76,000 soldiers.
84,000 U.S. soldiers in Europe
At the end of 2025, U.S. forces in Europe were estimated at about 84,000 troops. Of these, the vast majority, about 68,000, are permanently assigned to bases in various countries: about 36,400 in Germany, the main U.S. support point in Europe; 12,600 more in Italy, another 10,000 in the United Kingdom, or nearly 4,000 in Spain, according to official December figures. They are joined by thousands more troops sent as part of rotational deployments —such as the 10,000 troops stationed in Poland or those deployed in Romania— or for temporary missions, according to the U.S. Department of Defense.
The estimate is that U.S. troops will be reduced to the same number as before the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a reinforcement in Europe, about 80,000 troops.
“The fact that this is not a broader withdrawal highlights, on the one hand, a political reality in the United States that limits the government’s room for maneuver and, on the other, the recognition that the U.S. presence in Europe is simply too valuable to endure deeper cuts,” analyzes Kochis.
In total, the United States has 31 military bases called “persistent” —which it has used continuously for at least 15 years and over which it exercises some degree of operational control— in Europe, mostly in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. They are joined by another 19 facilities to which the U.S. Department of Defense has “access.”
These are air, naval bases, army garrisons, missile defense systems, and surveillance centers that allow Washington to maintain ground units, Navy warships, and aircraft of the Army, Navy, and Air Force on European territory. Most bases are interoperable with NATO’s actions and needs. The command center of U.S. forces, EUCOM, is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany.
Kochis emphasizes that, nevertheless, Trump’s announcement must be taken very seriously. “The Russian threat to NATO is as real as ever, so returning to the pre-2022 situation sends the wrong signal,” the analyst points out by email.
Especially because, as Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned after learning of the decision about Germany: “The greatest threat to the transatlantic community are not its external enemies, but the ongoing disintegration of our alliance.”
The greatest threat to the transatlantic community are not its external enemies, but the ongoing disintegration of our alliance. We must all do what it takes to reverse this disastrous trend.
— Donald Tusk (@donaldtusk) May 2, 2026
And Trump’s decision once again puts under strain an organization that does not seem to find the key to appease its main —and most volatile— partner: neither the constant praise of Trump’s management by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, nor the commitment reached at the The Hague summit almost a year ago to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, are making the Republican stop questioning —and thus undermining— what is considered the most successful defensive alliance in history.
“We must do whatever it takes to reverse this disastrous trend,” Tusk demanded in a message on X.
But the “this is not our war” with which Europe responded almost unanimously to Trump’s demand that allies help him reopen the Strait of Hormuz, closed following a war against Iran that he launched without consulting or warning any of his European partners, has only strained the already difficult relationship, also tested earlier this year with Greenland, when for the first time the EU stopped Trump from annexing the autonomous territory of Denmark.
Because it is not only the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, who stands up to Trump, first refusing to commit to 5% defense spending and now closing its airspace to flights involved in Operation Epic Fury against Iran, as well as preventing the use of the Rota (Cádiz) and Morón de la Frontera (Seville) bases for combat or refueling aircraft. The British Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, or even the Italian Giorgia Meloni, until recently one of Trump’s key allies in Europe, have unleashed the Republican’s anger and threats in recent weeks for not supporting his new military adventure in the Middle East.
In fact, this week Trump threatened to also withdraw troops from Spain and Italy. A few days earlier, Reuters had leaked that the Pentagon was looking for ways to “sanction” “difficult” NATO allies who do not help in the conflict with Iran, such as (again) Spain or the United Kingdom. On Friday, Defense Minister Margarita Robles recalled that Spain is “committed to international legality and the Atlantic Alliance.” That is why, she added: “I would ask President Trump to respect Spain.”
Deterrence and defense
That is why Pistorius has emphasized the need to strengthen the so-called European pillar of the Alliance. “It is clear that NATO must be more European in order to continue being transatlantic. Europeans must take more responsibility for our security,” he stressed. It is an argument that countries most exposed to the Russian threat, such as Estonia, have also been insisting on for some time. Its Prime Minister, Kristen Michal, recalled in an interview with EL PAÍS just a week ago that its net defense budget this year will already reach 5.4%, above the NATO target for 2035.
The new war in the Middle East is also causing the United States to warn European countries like Estonia, which buy weapons from it, that delivery will be delayed “because, as the conflict with Iran continues, they have to review their own stocks” before delivering orders to allies, Michal confirmed, for whom this only reinforces the idea that Europe must be more autonomous in defense.
An idea also emphasized by the Alliance itself. NATO spokesperson Allison Hart said this Saturday that the announced “troop adjustment” “underscores the need for Europe to invest more in defense and take a greater share of responsibility for shared security,” indicating in this regard the agreement to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 agreed at The Hague summit last June. “We continue to trust in our ability to guarantee our deterrence and defense as this process of moving towards a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO continues,” she added.
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