If Venezuelans have learned anything over the past decades, it is that the best intentions of the interlocutors do not guarantee political progress. This is proven by more than a dozen negotiation processes between the chavista government and the democratic opposition, most ending in farce, frustration, or fraud. Will the dialogue starting tomorrow be different from the previous ones?
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The recent joint statement by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia made it clear that the main opposition leaders will not participate in the negotiation seeking to renew the National Electoral Council and part of the Supreme Court of Justice with the ultimate goal of paving the way for democratic, fair, and transparent elections. This does not mean that the talks led by Dinorah Figuera have sunk before setting sail. But it does highlight the tension within the opposition camp. After years of hopes and disappointments, those who consider it another chavista maneuver to perpetuate power face off again against those who believe it is worth trying because this time the pressure comes directly from Washington.
The chavismo also does not come united, as it did under the leadership of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. In recent days, figures like Mario Silva and Iris Varela have publicly criticized the transitional government leaders for collaborating with U.S. demands and negotiating with opposition sectors they consider illegitimate. They were joined by a group led by former Vice President Elías Jaua, who called for a dialogue “among Venezuelans, for Venezuelans, and by Venezuelans,” a cautious way to reject U.S. tutelage. None of these leaders represent the center of power today, but they express the discontent of sectors displaced by the troika made up of the Rodríguez brothers and Diosdado Cabello.
The biggest novelty of this process, however, is not the fragmentation of the opposition nor that of chavismo. It is the role of the United States. Unlike previous negotiations, Washington will not act as a facilitator or companion, but as an arbiter with enormous vested interests. The opposition and the government negotiate, but Trump decides. This raises an inevitable question: can there be a democratic transition when the real decision-making center is outside Venezuela?
That is the question hovering over the entire process. And the answer largely depends on what the real priorities of the Trump administration are. These do not always appear aligned with those of Venezuelans and not even with the opposition leadership, as the de facto veto against María Corina Machado seems to demonstrate. While Donald Trump has insisted on the need to guarantee Venezuelan economic stability, Marco Rubio has reiterated that the ultimate goal should be the holding of democratic elections. Between these two positions is Deputy Secretary Michael Kozak, who has spoken of finding a middle ground that allows conditions for an election before the current U.S. presidential term ends. That is, neither too early nor too late: probably in 2028.
The coming months will test Dinorah Figuera’s ability to provide legitimacy to a negotiation that today lacks the support of much of the opposition. That legitimacy will not come from statements or photographs of meetings, but from results. For many Venezuelans, the dialogue will only make sense if it produces concrete changes: the renewal of electoral authorities, the restoration of political and civil rights, the recovery of spaces for freedom of expression and the press, and a reform of the judicial system that allows rebuilding institutional checks and balances.
María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, for their part, have reiterated that they will return to Venezuela. But if a few months ago that possibility seemed to naturally fit within a strategy of express transition through presidential elections, today it is not clear how it would contribute to a negotiating process that seeks precisely to open institutional spaces gradually and with an electoral calendar that starts by renewing the parliament before presidential elections. Among the most skeptical sectors of the opposition, the suspicion prevails that Washington’s real objective is not to democratize the country but to stabilize it to facilitate oil and mining business.
Recent statements by Trump encourage that perception. A few days ago he said that Chris Wright, his Secretary of Energy, was the one governing Venezuela. At the same time, the Treasury Department decided to ease controls on the Venezuelan government to favor financial stability, economic recovery, and reconstruction after the earthquakes of June 24. For many opposition members, these signals reflect the radical power asymmetry between the two countries.
A person close to González Urrutia and Machado, who agreed to speak on condition of anonymity, sums up that view bluntly: “The United States does not care about the outcome of the dialogue. It wants stability to exploit resources. That is why it eases sanctions and keeps Delcy Rodríguez in power. The tutelage is absolute. It is about colonizing a failed state to extract its resources.”
The same source warns of a growing distance between Machado and sectors of the Trump administration, including Rubio. Other observers agree that the decision to stay out of the negotiation has not been well received in Washington. However, for influential figures in both the Republican and Democratic parties, from María Elvira Salazar and Bernie Moreno to Tim Kaine, Machado remains the option with the greatest legitimacy to compete in a possible presidential election.
Despite these tensions, some believe that precisely Washington’s influence increases the chances that the process will produce results. With the advantage of those who retain control of the institutions—and also have the endorsement of the United States—the chavista government has not even revealed the names of its negotiating team yet.
Can there then be a democratic transition when the real decision-making center is outside Venezuela? Yes, but only if the dialogue produces verifiable progress and does not become a mere political stabilization operation to do business with Venezuela’s strategic resources, even if it involves lifting sanctions, which is the regime’s first demand. The legitimacy of the process will ultimately depend less on who drives it than on Figuera and her team’s ability to offer a credible electoral calendar, restore the political rights of parties and candidates, and guarantee basic conditions of transparency and democratic competition.
None of this will be possible without freedom of expression and the press, nor without an active citizenry. After years of unfulfilled promises, the main guarantee that the popular will, thwarted by force on July 28, 2024, will not be mocked again will be a mobilized society, capable of simultaneously pressuring the government and the opposition so that agreements translate into facts. The new dialogue remains a journey into the unknown. The difference is that this time, success or failure will depend on the concrete changes that return to Venezuelans control of their own destiny. That will be the measure by which Figuera and her team are judged.
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